Tactics Board Day 4

B>Netherlands 2 – 0 Denmark (Group E)

The Netherlands’ first game at a major tournament is always an occasion which inspires great anticipation amongst football fans across the globe. Thirty-six years ago the venue was the Niedersachsenstadion in Hanover, West Germany. The Oranje lined out for the opening game of the 1974 World Cup, with former Ajax manager Rinus Michels at the helm. Uruguay were the opposition as Michels and his team prepared to unveil their new system of ‘Total Football’ to the world. They went on to win that first game 2-0, the perfect start to a run which led them to their first ever World Cup final. Despite losing out to the hosts, this Dutch squad had transformed the image of their national side, and modern footballing philosophy as a whole.

In the interceding years however, The Dutch have reached just one more World Cup final, that coming four years after their first. Despite their much-admired brand of football, success has proved elusive for one of the powerhouses of the world game. In 2010, as the latest generation of Dutch footballers took to the field in the South African sunshine, we perhaps witnessed the beginning of a new Dutch footballing philosophy.

There was no giant change, of course, but perhaps an added maturity and solidity which could develop into a new approach for a team so burdened by the weight of their heritage. Current manager, Bert van Marwijk is a man determined to finally bring success on the world stage to a nation for which it is long overdue. To do this however, may come at some cost to the philosophy which Michels so deeply established in the modern subconscious and footballing zeitgeist of the Dutch people.

This opening game of a new tournament saw Marwijk set-up a distinctly more rigid and tactically-responsible team than any we’ve seen recently from the Dutch. They began in a 4-4-1-1 formation with two holding midfielders, in Mark Van Bommel and Nigel De Jong, with Wesley Sneijder playing just off Robin Van Persie. It had the appearance of a system employed by many top European clubs of recent times, notably Liverpool and Inter Milan, and was a far cry from the fluid, roaming improvisation of the class of ’74. This is a bold move from Marwijk, but there are plenty of kinks that need to be ironed out if the World Cup is to be paraded through the streets of Amsterdam come mid-July.

With Arjen Robben missing through injury, Marwijk elected to use Rafael Van der Vaart in the wide-left position. This instantly created a problem. While a supremely gifted footballer, Van der Vaart is too similar a player to Sneijder and both men sought to act as the playmaker for their side. Van der Vaart regularly drifted in from the flanks to attempt to influence the game from the centre; this meant that he and Sneijder began getting in each other’s way. It also had the effect of narrowing the Dutch’s play. With no recognised left-sided midfielder they naturally began attacking almost exclusively through the middle, right-midfielder Dirk Kuyt being a natural centre-forward, he was also inclined to come inside. This narrowness completely suited the Danes as they packed the centre of the pitch and made themselves very difficult to break down. Christian Poulson was getting through a supreme amount of work as his side’s midfield destroyer, thwarting the in-form Sneijder. Such was Poulson’s dominance early on that Sneijder was dropping very deep to collect possession but, with his side lacking width, he found himself resorting to ambitious, eye-of-a-needle passes.

Sneijder and Van der Vaart soon began swapping positions in order to ensure one man would always be manning the left flank, but this changed little as neither player is particularly suited to the role. The Danes meanwhile were looking comfortable and, as time wore on, began to slowly come out of their shell in an attacking sense. Centre-back Daniel Agger was looking to create from deep; his long diagonal balls troubling the Dutch rear guard. With their five-man midfield stifling the Dutch creativity, lone-striker Nicklas Bendtner was doing his level best to give his side an attacking outlet and some form of offensive threat. On the rare occasions he received quality service, the Arsenal front man looked sharp and dangerous, with midfield runners looking to get beyond him and in behind the under worked Dutch defence.

The game’s complexion changed entirely after two big events in the second-half. The first was a dreadful own-goal by young full-back Simon Poulson which totally deflated the Danish players, and the second was the replacement of Van der Vaart by a true winger in Eljero Elia. Elia was just what the Dutch needed to restore balance to the team’s play, his direct running and hugging of the touch-line paved the way for a more fluent and eye-catching Dutch performance in the latter stages of the second-half as they coasted to a deserved victory.

It certainly wasn’t ‘Total Football’ from the Dutch, but it most certainly was winning football.

Cameroon 0 – 1 Japan (Group E)

With only three group games per nation, every match is of huge importance to a team’s qualification aspirations. Japan and Cameroon kicked-off their opening game of the 2010 World Cup knowing that defeat would turn progression to the knockout stages into a very steep hill to climb. This significance translated into a very cautious and timid opening from both teams.

Cameroon lined up in a 4-3-2-1 formation, with captain Samuel Eto’o playing on the right-side of the ‘2’. Pierre Webo led the line for the African nation against a very disciplined Japanese outfit. They went with a 4-5-1 formation and signalled their intent to sit back and contain their opponents almost from the first whistle. The game endured a scrappy opening period in which neither side excelled at possession retention. The Japanese were looking to play safe passes as often as possible and seemed wary of Cameroon’s threat on the break. They particularly targeted full-back Benoit Assou-Ekoto, closing the left-back down intensely whenever he received the ball. Offsides were also a regular feature early on as both team’s were guilty of making sloppy runs in behind. With the Japanese midfield so compact, Eto’o was moving very wide on the Cameroon right-side in search of the ball. A combination of this extreme width and furious Japanese pressing meant that the Africans’ key-man had almost no opportunity to influence the game.

With their opposition organised so conservatively, the attacking onus was on Cameroon. They badly needed to get on the ball and look to stretch and pressurise the Japanese defence, but they lacked the offensive nous to be effective against such a well-drilled team. They still looked the best bet for a goal, and so it came as quite a shock when Japan broke the deadlock in the latter stages of the first-half. A mistake apiece from their full-backs was Cameroon’s undoing. Dalsuke Matsui was allowed far too much time on the ball by Assou-Ekotto, being given a good five yards to turn and line-up a looping cross towards the far post. Right-back Stephane Mbia then tucked in much too far and jumped for the ball with his centre-half, leaving behind plenty of space for the totally unmarked Keisuke Honda to control and finish.

This was a wonderful boost to the far from free-scoring Japanese. Their system had been set up to stop Cameroon from playing and now that they had nicked a goal, their overt negativity left them perfectly placed to see out the result. Into the second-half Cameroon still had not managed to formulate an answer to the question posed by their opponents. Eto’o continued in his wide-right role to similarly negligible effect while Webo was a non-entity up front. Their young central-midfielder Joel Matip, chosen ahead of Arsenal’s Alex Song, is still in the infancy of his international career and was not an ideal choice for the central position of Cameroon’s midfield three. The youngster is a defensive-midfielder and was tidy in possession when his team needed a more creative force in the centre of the pitch.

As the game reached its conclusion, Japan retreated deeper and deeper, eventually setting up camp inside their own penalty area. Eto’o was finally pushed centrally and Cameroon looked like they might be able to salvage a point in the dying minutes. It wasn’t to be however as Japan managed to hold on for an invaluable three points in Group E. Their football won’t be winning any beauty contests but it proved effective in this one as Cameroon never looked like stamping their own brand of football on a game which cried out for them to do so.

Italy 1 – 1 Paraguay (Group F)

Continuing with the theme of national footballing identity, the Italian style of Catenaccio is no less famous nor less embedded in the psyche of it’s footballing population than the Dutch’s ‘Total Football’. Catenaccio entails the defensive, responsible and cautious style of football regularly associated with the Italian national team. A system based around the marking of zones across the pitch and a steely focus on goal prevention, it has been employed by generations of Italian managers to great effect and success. I referenced the fact that ‘Total Football’, while aesthetically magnificent, does not often translate into success, Catenaccio however often creates a dire spectacle but is inherently centred around victory at all costs.

Italy began this game, typically, in a 4-5-1 system. Alberto Gilardino operated in the lone-striker’s role, with Vincenzo Iaquinta and Simone Pepe playing wide-left and wide-right respectively. An enormous part of the success of the Italian’s style is Daniele de Rossi at centre-midfield. The Roma player is an exemplary all-action midfielder. His energy and constant harrying in the middle for Italy adds greatly to their defensive solidity and general performance. Marcello Lippi’s side used their two wide-men to good effect when in possession and when chasing the ball. Their formation allowed Iaquinta and Pepe to tuck-in with their three central-midfielders when defending, creating a compact unit that is highly difficult to break down, and when they won the ball back, these two could spring to their touchlines and stretch the play. Claudio Marchisio was another vital cog in the Italian machine; he played in a free role between midfield and attack and was tasked with providing quality service to the front three. For much of the game however, he found himself crowded out by Paraguayan defenders and scarcely troubled.

Paraguay were doing a decent job containing the Italian threat but offered little themselves in attacking situations. The Italian forwards and midfield heavily pressurised the South American’s defenders, forcing them to hit long, aimless balls to the waiting Italian defenders. This tactic trapped Paraguay into playing to their opponents strengths. With a high-line in operation, Cannavaro and Chiellini were usually on hand to clear or control any long balls played out of the opposing defence. Paraguay did improve as an attacking force however, they attempted to suck in the Italian pressers and play simple one-twos around them to progress down the field. When this came off, it allowed them the opportunity to run at the none too pacy Italian back-line.

Italy tend to excel when able to play on the counter-attack, but with Paraguay sitting off them, the game seemed to be at an impasse. Paraguay were getting eight men behind the ball at all times, just leaving their front two in advanced positions. Marchisio was growing frustrated with his lack of impact, pulling wide to look for possession and thus diluting the Italian presence in the centre. Paraguay’s extremely high work-rate ensured that Italy could never settle on the ball and they clearly lacked the creativity and influence of Andrea Pirlo in midfield. After Paraguay’s goal, Italy were forced to emerge from their comfort zone, and set about chasing the game.

Lippi switched his team to a 4-4-2, with Iaquinta partnering Gilardino up front. This seemed to drastically improve the team’s forward play and Riccardo Montolivio began to make an impact in the centre of midfield. De Rossi continued to rampage across the pitch and Italy were good value for their equaliser, coming just like the first, from a set-piece. Paraguay switched to a five man defence late-on as the Italian pressure continued to mount, but Italy still couldn’t open them up. The South American team were delighted at the final-whistle with a very good result against the group’s favourites to progress. They have proved that they will be a tough nut to crack for any side they meet in South Africa and Italy will look much better than this against a more ambitious side that goes out to attack them.