Tactics Board Day 2
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Greece 0 – 2 South Korea (Group B)
Heading into this game, both teams would have been aware that a win would be a huge step towards the knockout stages. Though only the first game, this group (minus Argentina) looked extremely hard to call from the outset, and three points in this game would be massively important. If we were to assume that the Argentines have the quality to progress, then it was anyone’s guess as to who would seal the second qualification spot between South Korea, Greece and Nigeria. Thus it was imperative that the coaches got their tactics spot on.
Since Euro 2004, Greece have been hailed as set-piece virtuosos; it has regularly proved their most potent form of attack. While they may excel at attacking dead-ball situations, this game was only seven minutes old before they showed their deficiencies at defending them. Otto Rehagel set his team up to bring almost everybody back into the box when defending a set-piece and organised his team to mark zonally. The zonal-marking system can be a very effective one, but it requires high levels of concentration from the defending players and a willingness to attack the ball. Neither were in evidence as Lee Jung Soo ghosted into generous space at the back post to tap-in a routine goal, as three Greek defenders, who had drifted into the same empty zone, watched on.
The South Koreans dominated for the vast majority of this game and could easily have won by more goals than they did. One of the main contributing factors to their dominance was the formation employed by their manager compared to that which Rehagel utilised for Greece. The Greeks lined up in a 3-4-3 formation featuring two wing-backs and two central midfielders. Their front-line of Samaras on the left, Gekas in the centre and Charisteas on the right never got into the game as a cohesive triumvirate. Gekas switched from time to time with Charisteas to upset the Korean centre-halves, who had to adapt to marking either a small, tricky forward or a big target-man depending on who was occupying the centre for Greece. But they rarely received quality supply from their midfield.
The reason for this is that the Koreans targeted the centre of the park as the key battle in winning the game, and this proved decisive. By lining up in a 4-5-1 formation, the Korean central-midfielders had a one man advantage over their opposition all game long. This mismatch allowed the Koreans to dominate possession by always having a man free in the centre. Another factor which helped decide this game was the unorganised closing down from the Greek front three. By pressing separately, they allowed the Korean defence to play the ball around them and provide clean possession for their midfielders. Once the ball went forward, South Korea’s forwards constantly crossed runs, dragging defenders out of position and providing a plethora of opportunities for the man in possession to supply reverse passes to unlock the Greek back-line. The Greek defence aided their own downfall by sitting deep and allowing plenty of space behind their over-worked midfield for the Koreans to burst into.
This was a perfect environment for the fluid Korean attacking football to flourish. When the opposition full-backs pushed forward, Huh Jung-Moo’s men immediately fed their wide-men into the space left behind and from here they could box in the three Greek centre-halves, who were akin to rabbits caught in rapidly approaching headlights. With Park Ji-Sung operating in a free-role, the skipper could receive the ball almost at will and cause havoc; or arrive from deep as he did to devastating effect for the Korean second goal.
Greece’s only obvious attacking plan was to spread the ball wide to their wing-backs and tuck in their front three in anticipation of a cross from deep. This created a couple of opportunities where Greece had numbers in the box but the Korean defence could see these crosses coming well in advance and they were met by routine clearances.
As the game wore on, Korea could afford the luxury of taking their foot off the gas in preparation for their next game. Greece will need to improve drastically in their next two games to stand any chance of qualification. The fact that they had three different captains over the course of the 90 minutes suggests a lack of true leadership on the pitch and they were tactically out –classed in this game by a superior Korean outfit.
Argentina 1 – 0 Nigeria (Group B)
One of the major talking points coming into this World Cup centred around the system and players Diego Maradona would employ in his Argentine starting XI. The footballing world waited in anticipation ahead of the South Americans’ first game at these finals to receive, what turned out to be, a typically surprising answer.
Maradona decided to start with a natural winger, Jonas Gutierrez, at right-back and what appeared to be a straight 4-4-2 formation to face Nigeria. This system turned out to be a highly effective one, and I’ll attempt here to break down and analyse its workings. Fresh from their respective, outstanding European campaigns this past season, Martin Demichelis and Walter Samuel were paired at the heart of defence. With neither particularly renowned as a ball-playing defender, the emphasis was clearly on solidity in the centre and a desire to match up to the physical presence of the Nigerian attack. Gutierrez had played the previous two friendly games at right-back for his country, yet it was still a surprise to see him entrusted with the position in the World Cup itself. Maradona seemingly wished to exploit the Newcastle player’s natural attacking abilities and the method to the madness became clear once the game kicked-off. Carlos Tevez, operating on the right side of the Argentina midfield, immediately began making central runs, opening up the right-flank for Gutierrez to move into space. From here he could cross to the now central Tevez, as well as Lionel Messi and Gonzalo Higuain.
The potential defensive exposure this risked was solved by the combined efforts of holding midfielders Javier Mascherano and Juan Veron. The two midfielders were instructed to sit in front of their defence and cover empty spaces left by players moving forward, as well as to sweep up any central danger. Veron seemed to be given slightly more licence to get forward and create; he made himself available to his front-men regularly and looked to recycle the ball as often as possible. Mascherano turned in a phenomenal display as a screen for the Argentine defence, rarely entering the opposition half; he concerned himself with the destruction of Nigerian forward movements. This provided a tremendous balance between attack and defence for Maradona’s men and the solidity allowed the wealth of attacking talent to fully express themselves.
Messi was listed as a strike-partner for Higuain but was actually deployed in a free-role. Allowed to roam about the final third in search of the ball, he devastated the Nigerian rear-guard who found themselves chasing 5”7 shadows. Their intensity without the ball was perhaps one of the most impressive aspects of the Argentine performance. Messi and Tevez pressed the Nigerian defence furiously while Mascherano and Veron quickly got tight to the Nigerian midfielders to disrupt their attacking flow. These strategies were coupled to excellent effect with a high defensive line; Demichelis and Samuel were never too far behind their midfielders and as such were usually on hand to mop up any balls their sitting destroyers missed.
Nigeria’s main problem seemed to be getting the ball to stick up-front. They desperately needed their front-men to establish a foothold in the Argentine half in order to relieve the almost relentless South American onslaught. Too often however a heavy touch or eager defender returned possession to the men in blue and white stripes. When Nigeria did have some attacking joy, it usually came from exploiting the defensive frailties of Gutierrez. While he was helpful in attack, he increasingly appeared a liability in defence. Yakubu managed to turn him on more than one occasion but was left disappointed as the Nigerians were reluctant to push men forward for fear of being caught on the counter-attack. Nigeria allowed their opposition to dictate the play; their wariness of the Argentine attacking menace forced them to drop deep and therefore allow bundles of space for Di Maria and Veron, in particular, to maintain possession and control.
Argentina weren’t all short passes though; they occasionally mixed up their passing style by playing two or three short passes before hitting a long searching ball to try to find a deep run from Messi or Tevez. Higuain provided a good foil for his more mobile strike-partners; he acted as the necessary target-man for the others to play off of. As the game wore on and Argentina still hadn’t found a second goal, the Nigerians began to grow in confidence. They finally committed numbers forward and worked the ball sharply across the pitch to find gaps in the Argentine defence.
They never quite found the killer touch however and Maradona’s side held on for a deserved win, which puts them in the driving seat in the group. Against a more potent attack they could well come unstuck, but they certainly have the firepower up front to cause any team major problems.
England 1 – 1 USA (Group C)
Easily one of the most derided figures in modern international football, this game will have showed many why Fabio Capello places so much faith in Emile Heskey.
Heskey has been a regular fixture in the England starting line-up since Capello took the reins and while many will point to his poor strike-rate, it’s his many unique qualities which have earned him the backing of the Italian. The Aston Villa man hasn’t been prolific in front of goal in over a decade but he still brings plenty to the international table. England operate largely in a flat 4-4-2 formation and for this system to succeed, a balanced strike-partnership is crucial. With Rooney so obviously England’s key man, allowing him to perform to his optimum is a huge priority for Capello.
Rooney is at his most influential when allowed to drop into space and gain a yard on defenders. For this to happen, in Capello’s system, a battering-ram type partner is a necessity. Heskey was born to play this role, his considerable power and physicality allows him to be the focal point of England’s attacks. He is an ideal target for his team-mates to hit. This means that Rooney can drift away and feed off of the many balls that Heskey wins in the final third of the pitch. Heskey also compliments Rooney’s movement excellently. They never make the same runs, Heskey preferring to take a more considered and reserved approach as opposed to Rooney’s dynamic running across the defensive line. Heskey’s presence also allows England to commit more men beyond the ball. Midfielders can knock the ball into him and run beyond for the return pass, safe in the knowledge that, more often than not, Heskey will protect the ball and be able to recycle it to the runners moving off of him. He is an ideal foil for a mobile, all-action striker.
Injury to starting central-midfielder, Gareth Barry forced Capello to start Steven Gerrard alongside Frank Lampard, a much maligned pairing. But it was the captain who opened the scoring early on when Heskey out-muscled his defender and picked out Gerrard’s run from deep expertly. Lampard had been instructed not to push on too much, he stayed back in front of the back four to allow England to utilise Gerrard’s considerable industry in the centre. This disciplined role was a far cry from the Lampard of Chelsea, used to marauding in front of opposition back-lines, but was a necessary and effective duty against a dangerous USA side.
The Americans struggled early on to establish any kind of foothold in the game. They looked to supply Landon Donovan on the right flank but he was well marshalled by Ashley Cole. They improved considerably when they managed to find their playmaker, central-midfielder Michael Bradley. The manager’s son is an important player in this US team and while his passing can often be erratic, he operates as the quarterback of his side (I couldn’t resist the American Football reference). From a deep position, he often looks to receive the ball and spread play out to his wide men and keep the team ticking over.
Despite the improvement, England were still in control and finding plenty of success exploiting the flanks. Capello likes to play a right-footed player in the left-midfield position for England and after James Milner was withdrawn, Shaun Wright-Phillips was chosen to continue this trend. A key reason for the success of this tactic is left-back Ashley Cole. His overlapping runs on the outside allow the winger to cut inside onto his stronger foot and the USA were finding it a struggle to counter this problem. Eventually Donovan was deployed further forward on the American right side in order to anchor Cole in the full-back position and it seemed to work quite well.
Jozy Altidore was the key target up front for the Americans and, despite being well handled by Ledley King and John Terry, his movement looked sharp at times. This encouraged Capello to instruct his defence to drop deep and ensure the striker was well tracked and to negate any opportunity for the American midfield to play in behind England’s central-defence, who are not the quickest around. This tactic looked an astute move from Capello when the US, with no runs to pick out in front of them, were reduced to speculative strikes from long-distance. Unfortunately for the English, it was one of these routine efforts which Rob Green fumbled into his own net for the equaliser.
As the game progressed England continued to dominate but failed to find a breakthrough. Heskey began pulling into the channels up front to create space in the centre for Rooney, but the target man’s knock-downs were being snuffed out by a compact American defence. At the other end, Altidore looked to isolate substitute Jamie Carragher and almost scored from one such occasion, only for Green to redeem himself with an excellent save. American manager Bob Bradley switched his side’s formation to 4-5-1 late on in the pursuit of a draw, which his team achieved and arguably, deserved.
Heading into this game, both teams would have been aware that a win would be a huge step towards the knockout stages. Though only the first game, this group (minus Argentina) looked extremely hard to call from the outset, and three points in this game would be massively important. If we were to assume that the Argentines have the quality to progress, then it was anyone’s guess as to who would seal the second qualification spot between South Korea, Greece and Nigeria. Thus it was imperative that the coaches got their tactics spot on.
The South Koreans dominated for the vast majority of this game and could easily have won by more goals than they did. One of the main contributing factors to their dominance was the formation employed by their manager compared to that which Rehagel utilised for Greece. The Greeks lined up in a 3-4-3 formation featuring two wing-backs and two central midfielders. Their front-line of Samaras on the left, Gekas in the centre and Charisteas on the right never got into the game as a cohesive triumvirate. Gekas switched from time to time with Charisteas to upset the Korean centre-halves, who had to adapt to marking either a small, tricky forward or a big target-man depending on who was occupying the centre for Greece. But they rarely received quality supply from their midfield.
The reason for this is that the Koreans targeted the centre of the park as the key battle in winning the game, and this proved decisive. By lining up in a 4-5-1 formation, the Korean central-midfielders had a one man advantage over their opposition all game long. This mismatch allowed the Koreans to dominate possession by always having a man free in the centre. Another factor which helped decide this game was the unorganised closing down from the Greek front three. By pressing separately, they allowed the Korean defence to play the ball around them and provide clean possession for their midfielders. Once the ball went forward, South Korea’s forwards constantly crossed runs, dragging defenders out of position and providing a plethora of opportunities for the man in possession to supply reverse passes to unlock the Greek back-line. The Greek defence aided their own downfall by sitting deep and allowing plenty of space behind their over-worked midfield for the Koreans to burst into.
This was a perfect environment for the fluid Korean attacking football to flourish. When the opposition full-backs pushed forward, Huh Jung-Moo’s men immediately fed their wide-men into the space left behind and from here they could box in the three Greek centre-halves, who were akin to rabbits caught in rapidly approaching headlights. With Park Ji-Sung operating in a free-role, the skipper could receive the ball almost at will and cause havoc; or arrive from deep as he did to devastating effect for the Korean second goal.
Greece’s only obvious attacking plan was to spread the ball wide to their wing-backs and tuck in their front three in anticipation of a cross from deep. This created a couple of opportunities where Greece had numbers in the box but the Korean defence could see these crosses coming well in advance and they were met by routine clearances.
As the game wore on, Korea could afford the luxury of taking their foot off the gas in preparation for their next game. Greece will need to improve drastically in their next two games to stand any chance of qualification. The fact that they had three different captains over the course of the 90 minutes suggests a lack of true leadership on the pitch and they were tactically out –classed in this game by a superior Korean outfit.
Argentina 1 – 0 Nigeria (Group B)
One of the major talking points coming into this World Cup centred around the system and players Diego Maradona would employ in his Argentine starting XI. The footballing world waited in anticipation ahead of the South Americans’ first game at these finals to receive, what turned out to be, a typically surprising answer.
The potential defensive exposure this risked was solved by the combined efforts of holding midfielders Javier Mascherano and Juan Veron. The two midfielders were instructed to sit in front of their defence and cover empty spaces left by players moving forward, as well as to sweep up any central danger. Veron seemed to be given slightly more licence to get forward and create; he made himself available to his front-men regularly and looked to recycle the ball as often as possible. Mascherano turned in a phenomenal display as a screen for the Argentine defence, rarely entering the opposition half; he concerned himself with the destruction of Nigerian forward movements. This provided a tremendous balance between attack and defence for Maradona’s men and the solidity allowed the wealth of attacking talent to fully express themselves.
Messi was listed as a strike-partner for Higuain but was actually deployed in a free-role. Allowed to roam about the final third in search of the ball, he devastated the Nigerian rear-guard who found themselves chasing 5”7 shadows. Their intensity without the ball was perhaps one of the most impressive aspects of the Argentine performance. Messi and Tevez pressed the Nigerian defence furiously while Mascherano and Veron quickly got tight to the Nigerian midfielders to disrupt their attacking flow. These strategies were coupled to excellent effect with a high defensive line; Demichelis and Samuel were never too far behind their midfielders and as such were usually on hand to mop up any balls their sitting destroyers missed.
Nigeria’s main problem seemed to be getting the ball to stick up-front. They desperately needed their front-men to establish a foothold in the Argentine half in order to relieve the almost relentless South American onslaught. Too often however a heavy touch or eager defender returned possession to the men in blue and white stripes. When Nigeria did have some attacking joy, it usually came from exploiting the defensive frailties of Gutierrez. While he was helpful in attack, he increasingly appeared a liability in defence. Yakubu managed to turn him on more than one occasion but was left disappointed as the Nigerians were reluctant to push men forward for fear of being caught on the counter-attack. Nigeria allowed their opposition to dictate the play; their wariness of the Argentine attacking menace forced them to drop deep and therefore allow bundles of space for Di Maria and Veron, in particular, to maintain possession and control.
Argentina weren’t all short passes though; they occasionally mixed up their passing style by playing two or three short passes before hitting a long searching ball to try to find a deep run from Messi or Tevez. Higuain provided a good foil for his more mobile strike-partners; he acted as the necessary target-man for the others to play off of. As the game wore on and Argentina still hadn’t found a second goal, the Nigerians began to grow in confidence. They finally committed numbers forward and worked the ball sharply across the pitch to find gaps in the Argentine defence.
They never quite found the killer touch however and Maradona’s side held on for a deserved win, which puts them in the driving seat in the group. Against a more potent attack they could well come unstuck, but they certainly have the firepower up front to cause any team major problems.
England 1 – 1 USA (Group C)
Easily one of the most derided figures in modern international football, this game will have showed many why Fabio Capello places so much faith in Emile Heskey.
Rooney is at his most influential when allowed to drop into space and gain a yard on defenders. For this to happen, in Capello’s system, a battering-ram type partner is a necessity. Heskey was born to play this role, his considerable power and physicality allows him to be the focal point of England’s attacks. He is an ideal target for his team-mates to hit. This means that Rooney can drift away and feed off of the many balls that Heskey wins in the final third of the pitch. Heskey also compliments Rooney’s movement excellently. They never make the same runs, Heskey preferring to take a more considered and reserved approach as opposed to Rooney’s dynamic running across the defensive line. Heskey’s presence also allows England to commit more men beyond the ball. Midfielders can knock the ball into him and run beyond for the return pass, safe in the knowledge that, more often than not, Heskey will protect the ball and be able to recycle it to the runners moving off of him. He is an ideal foil for a mobile, all-action striker.
Injury to starting central-midfielder, Gareth Barry forced Capello to start Steven Gerrard alongside Frank Lampard, a much maligned pairing. But it was the captain who opened the scoring early on when Heskey out-muscled his defender and picked out Gerrard’s run from deep expertly. Lampard had been instructed not to push on too much, he stayed back in front of the back four to allow England to utilise Gerrard’s considerable industry in the centre. This disciplined role was a far cry from the Lampard of Chelsea, used to marauding in front of opposition back-lines, but was a necessary and effective duty against a dangerous USA side.
The Americans struggled early on to establish any kind of foothold in the game. They looked to supply Landon Donovan on the right flank but he was well marshalled by Ashley Cole. They improved considerably when they managed to find their playmaker, central-midfielder Michael Bradley. The manager’s son is an important player in this US team and while his passing can often be erratic, he operates as the quarterback of his side (I couldn’t resist the American Football reference). From a deep position, he often looks to receive the ball and spread play out to his wide men and keep the team ticking over.
Despite the improvement, England were still in control and finding plenty of success exploiting the flanks. Capello likes to play a right-footed player in the left-midfield position for England and after James Milner was withdrawn, Shaun Wright-Phillips was chosen to continue this trend. A key reason for the success of this tactic is left-back Ashley Cole. His overlapping runs on the outside allow the winger to cut inside onto his stronger foot and the USA were finding it a struggle to counter this problem. Eventually Donovan was deployed further forward on the American right side in order to anchor Cole in the full-back position and it seemed to work quite well.
Jozy Altidore was the key target up front for the Americans and, despite being well handled by Ledley King and John Terry, his movement looked sharp at times. This encouraged Capello to instruct his defence to drop deep and ensure the striker was well tracked and to negate any opportunity for the American midfield to play in behind England’s central-defence, who are not the quickest around. This tactic looked an astute move from Capello when the US, with no runs to pick out in front of them, were reduced to speculative strikes from long-distance. Unfortunately for the English, it was one of these routine efforts which Rob Green fumbled into his own net for the equaliser.
As the game progressed England continued to dominate but failed to find a breakthrough. Heskey began pulling into the channels up front to create space in the centre for Rooney, but the target man’s knock-downs were being snuffed out by a compact American defence. At the other end, Altidore looked to isolate substitute Jamie Carragher and almost scored from one such occasion, only for Green to redeem himself with an excellent save. American manager Bob Bradley switched his side’s formation to 4-5-1 late on in the pursuit of a draw, which his team achieved and arguably, deserved.
About Dean Hayes
Dean covers Waterford United and, due to a challenge from Gareth, writes in an increasingly Gonzo style. Having found himself with a considerable surplus of a culinary herb, Dean founded sister 'site extrathyme.ie some years … View Full Profile