Tactics Board Day 1

South Africa 1 – 1 Mexico (Group A)

The opening game of a World Cup is always a tough one for the team facing the host nation. No host has ever lost their first game, so Mexico were guaranteed a huge challenge heading into this encounter with a South African team enjoying the backing of an entire continent. After the first 40 minutes however, one began to wonder if that extraordinary support was a help or a hindrance for the proud hosts.

South Africa produced a nervy and indecisive opening which saw the Mexicans take full control of the early exchanges. With their usual 4-3-3 formation, the South Americans were able to use their attackers to close down the South African defence on the edge of their own box. For most of the first-half this tactic worked a treat, almost totally nullifying any chance for the hosts to establish a short-passing game. By forcing them to hit the ball long to their lone front-man, the Mexicans could usetheir four on one numerical advantage at the back to sweep up these hopeful clearances and re-establish possession immediately. This tactic also allowed them to steal the ball from the South Africans in the final third and set up very dangerous opportunities, particularly through their primary danger-man, Giovanni dos Santos. The former Spurs and Barcelona youngster was a key figure in the opening half as Mexico monopolised territory. Manager Javier Aguirre had clearly instructed dos Santos to drop into the considerable space between the hosts’ midfield and defence. Too often the South Africans were too flat and allowed the Mexican runners from midfield to drift into positions from where they could be creative.

Despite this onslaught however, South Africa did not concede, and finally emerged from their shell in the final minutes of the half to stamp their own personality on a game which was passing them by. Their midfield became less static, making inter-changing movements which allowed for a slick and impressive passing display. They finished the half on top, playing the short, quick passes which had been so sorely missed from their play thus far, and were unlucky not to open the scoring.

The second 45 was welcomed by fresh blasts on the fans’ Vuvuzela horns and the return of the hosts’ delightful staccato passing rhythm which had emerged before the conclusion of the prior half. The ten-fold increase in volume of the melodically-challenged instruments signalled the arrival of the first goal of these World Cup finals. A ball won on the edge of their own box being swept to the other in 5 short, one and two-touch passes, to be met by an outstanding finish from Tshabalala. A goal worthy of gracing any team and any tournament. The Mexicans were not finding as much joy exploiting their oppositions’ flanks in the second-half, largely due to the replacement at half-time of the South African left-back, Thwala, who had been sinking in a lonely sea of quality Mexican wing-play. His replacement, Masilela looked a more composed, solid player and helped his side in attack by displaying a willingness to get forward and assist his team-mates in attack. Another big reason for the South African success of the second half was the work-rate of lone-striker, Katlego Mphela. The forward did plenty of selfless running to offer an outlet for his team to use when under pressure and to hassle the opposition defence. His midfield team-mates also introduced more subtlety to their movements, making them harder to track and ensuring somebody was always back to protect their defence.

Carlos Alberto Parreira’s side did however soon begin to revert to the overly cautious and aimless style with which they had played most of the first-half. Mexico brought on veteran striker Cauthemoc Blanco to add composure to their wayward attacking and soon re-established a foothold in the game. Barcelona utility-man, Rafael Marquez, had shackled South-African danger-man Stephen Pienaar, and his lack of creativity and composure in the centre aided the decline of the hosts’ performance. The almost inevitable Mexican equaliser came, deservedly, through Marquez, and Parreira will no doubt be fuming at the lack of concentration that allowed three free men at the back-post following an almost botched Mexican set-piece.

Overall a draw was perhaps the fair result. Neither side will be confident of progression to the next stage unless they improve considerably from this game. A Jekyll and Hide performance from the hosts contained some basic errors across the field, but also some lovely quick passing. The Mexicans have got good players in key areas but crucially, lack a true goal-scorer to finish the chances their wingers and forward-thinking midfielders create. Neither coach struck a decisive tactical victory but Aguirre perhaps shades it, his side could have been home and dry but for some erratic finishing.

France 0 – 0 Uruguay (Group A)

This game stood out as an intriguing battle between two quite similar sides, tactically. Raymond Domenech is a hard man to predict at the best of times, and his team-sheet did not disappoint in the unpredictability stakes. His French XI found no room for Florent Malouda, coming off the back of his best season in England and saw Nicolas Anelka employed as the lone front-man.

Both sides lined up in a variation of the 4-3-3 formation. France began with Anelka alone up top, supported on the wings by Franck Ribery and Sidney Govou. Uruguay were similarly organised in attack, with the prolific Diego Forlan supported by the even more prolific (albeit in the Dutch League) Luis Suarez and his fellow wide-man Gonzalez. The Uruguayan tactics looked immediately suspect as they tucked in their wingers to make a more compact unit, allowing France’s marauding full-backs to emerge from defence with the ball. They were also happy to allow the French defenders to pass the ball in their own half, only applying pressure when the opposition entered the Uruguayan half. This signalled a cautious counter-attacking approach from the South Americans as they could now drop deep and not allowing the French to pass their way through them.

It was no surprise then to see France dominate early on, their midfield looked particularly well-balanced. Lyon midfielder, Jeremy Toulalan was deployed as a holding player, instructed to play it simple and add the bite to their midfield. This allowed Abou Diaby the freedom to roam the park, making full use of his considerable energy and power. Finally Bordeaux maestro Yoann Gourcuff sat in behind Anelka and was tasked with being the main, central creative force. This looked a good game plan from Domenech but a combination of the Uruguayan’s rigid system and France’s own failings meant it proved ultimately ineffectual.

The main stumbling block for the French was a Benzema-shaped hole in their front-line. I say Benzema, but any target man would have done. They tried to get early balls into Anelka to allow him to turn and run at the Uruguayan defence. Yet too often the Chelsea man was forced wide, into the channels and France were left with no presence in the box. Occasionally Govou or Ribery would make a central run to provide an option but they’re lack of height or aerial presence made this idea a woefully ineffective one. Anelka was being forced into areas where he became isolated and easy for the Uruguayans to defend against. As a result the French looked toothless in attack.

At the opposite end of the pitch, Forlan was looking incredibly sharp for the South Americans. His movement was causing problems for Gallas and Abidal at the heart of the French defence. The game plan here was for Forlan to pull the opposition centre-halves out of position to create space for Suarez and Gonzalez. The Atletico Madrid man also began to drop deep to receive the ball on the turn, this would allow him to pick out the runs from the two wide men, in particular Suarez cutting into the centre and also allow for the Uruguayan midfielders to run beyond the ball. This game-plan never quite came off. Too often, when Forlan received the ball in space, his team mates were too far away to be picked out or drifted into offside positions.

For the second-half Uruguay manager Oscar Tabarez switched his side’s formation to 4-3-1-2. Suarez pushed forward to partner Forlan in attack, in the hope of encouraging inter-play between the two, and Gonzalez dropped into the hole to provide their ammunition. This formation allowed Tabarez’s men to maintain their rigid defensive system but adapted the front three to try and create a more cohesive attacking force. Domenech was well prepared however. His deployment of Toulalan in front of his back four meant that the Lyon man could shadow Gonzalez and he constantly thwarted attacks as he mopped up the danger in front of Gallas and Abidal. To counter this problem, Tabarez introduced Nicolas Lodeiro in place of Gonzalez. The youngster expected to cause more problems by adding the energy that the man he replaced had failed to bring to the position.

So often in football, it can be the tempo of a team’s play and not necessarily the quality that wins games. Uruguay’s counter-attacking game-plan allowed France to have superior possession of the ball, but the lethargic tempo with which they built attacks suited their opposition far too much. The rare times that the French upped the tempo and fired off one and two-touch passes were the times they looked most capable of opening up the stubborn Uruguayan rear-guard. Too often France killed their own momentum by taking too many touches or being too slow to recognise a good run.

This game was the archetypal case of two teams cancelling each other out. An ineffective French attacking display with most of the ball versus a solid defence and unambitious attacking strategy from Uruguay. This game was a marriage made in draw heaven; Domenech will have to go back to the drawing board if he harbours any ambitions of World Cup glory while Tabarez may be content with the result he seemed to set up his team to achieve.